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INTRODUCTION
The fundamental issue here is whether there is a clearly established liberty
interest against being taken from home confinement and placed in jail. If so, then
under the facts alleged and the reasonable inferences taken from those facts, the
ineluctable conclusion is that Richard Ortega’s clearly established rights against
deprivation of liberty without due process and against warrantless, unreasonable
seizure were violated, and the opinion below must be reversed. In the Opening
Brief, Ortega noted that “at least the First, Second, Seventh, Eight, and Tenth
Circuits had recognized that being removed from custodial confinement outside the
prison system and being placed in institutional confinement triggered a
constitutionally protected liberty interest.” AOB 15. And the Seventh Circuit had
found the right to be established by Supreme Court precedent in a case almost
identical to this one. AOB 16.
Rather than address the cases clearly establishing the rights at issue here,
Cloyd and the Metro Defendants engage in misdirection. Cloyd focuses on cases
stating that there is no right to home confinement before the sentence is issued,
Cloyd Br. 6-9, but does not address the cases cited in the Opening Brief clearly
stating that the liberty interest at issue here vests after receiving a sentence of home
confinement. The Metro Defendants attempt to deny that a liberty interest existed
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based on policy considerations against preventing flight by illegal aliens, Metro
Defendants’ Br. (“MD Br.”) 12, and a theory suggesting that this particular home
incarceration program is special and does not invoke a liberty interest, “MD Br.
10-12. Neither theory is supportable. The interest against flight is not at issue
here, since Ortega already was under home confinement. And this home
incarceration program is not materially different from any other home confinement
program. Cited case law clearly establishes that confinement in the home is
inherently different from confinement in jail.
Cloyd and the Metro Defendants also attempt to point fingers at each other
to avoid liability. Defendants who violate someone’s constitutional rights cannot
absolve themselves from liability by raising a divided infringement of rights
theory. Yet Cloyd raises a theory suggesting that so long as another agency carried
out the act of seizing Ortega when the detainer does not call for a seizure, Cloyd
cannot be liable for causing the seizure because it was an “honest mistake.” Cloyd
Br. 9-11. But the complaint alleges that Cloyd was not mistaken at all—he knew
the names and birthdates did not match. And to the extent the seizure was
foreseeable, Cloyd is responsible. He does not address that point or challenge the
district court’s finding that he proximately caused Ortega to be taken to jail. For
their part, Metro Defendants join in the attempt to divide the infringement by

-2-
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pointing the finger at Cloyd and claiming that it is reasonable to violate a liberty
interest based solely on an ICE detainer, without any further investigation or even
accepting evidence of its inaccuracy from the person against whom it was issued.
MD Br. 16.
Metro Defendants also raise a red herring by attempting to create a dispute
over background facts. But these disputes are irrelevant because (1) factual
disputes must be resolved in Ortega’s favor, and (2) even if the facts raised by the
Metro Defendants were untrue—they are not—those facts are beside the point.
With respect to the issue presented here, it does not matter whether Ortega was
handcuffed. Nor is it necessary to support Ortega’s claim at this stage that he
plead exactly which documents he made readily available to the officers who
seized him.
Cloyd issued an ICE detainer for Ortega because Ortega’s name and birth
date were similar, but not identical to, the name of an illegal alien in the ICE
database. The Metro Defendants, upon receiving the ICE detainer, violated
Ortega’s Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by taking him to jail.
Thus, the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court
erred by dismissing this case.

-3-
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ARGUMENT
I.

ORTEGA PROPERLY USED SUFFICIENTLY PLED FACTS,
REASONABLE INFERENCES, AND TO-BE-PROVEN FACTS.
Metro Defendants attempt to malign Ortega’s use of sufficiently pled facts,

reasonable inferences, and facts that Ortega contends will be proved at trial. MD
Br. at 3-5, 7-8, 17-18. But under the governing standards, Ortega may rely on
these facts. “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require pleadings to set forth ‘a
short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ and nothing
about the defense of qualified immunity alters this modest pleading requirement.”
Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). And
as this Court has clearly declared, when a district court grants the defense of
qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, the appellate court “accept[s] the facts
alleged in the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences therefrom in
the plaintiff’s favor.” Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 677 (6th Cir.
2001).
Given these standards, Metro Defendants’ concerns are baseless. For
example, Metro Defendants take issue with the allegation that Officers Eppler and
Skaggs removed Ortega from his home and transported Ortega to jail. Id. at 7, 1718. Yet Ortega properly pled, and Metro Defendants accept that Ortega properly
pled, that Officers Eppler and Skaggs detained Ortega, and that as a result of such
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detention Ortega was jailed at Metro Corrections’ holding facilities for four days.
MD Br. at 7. The reasonable inference is that they took Ortega from Ortega’s
home and transported him to jail, in light of the allegations that he was at home
when he was detained.
Metro Defendants’ incredulity over discussion of facts Ortega intends to
prove at trial is also unfounded. A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on
the basis of qualified immunity requires this Court to “determine whether [Ortega]
undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle
him relief.” Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
added). Ortega pled that, at the time he was detained by Metro Defendants, Ortega
had “readily available . . . proof of [his] American citizenship.” Second Amended
Complaint, 38R235. Thus, it is not surprising that Ortega would state that “[w]ith
an opportunity for discovery and to put on evidence, Ortega will establish that he
told the Officers that he could retrieve his birth certificate and social security card
to prove his citizenship before they took Ortega from his home.”1 Ortega Br. 20
(emphasis added). At most, drafting was somewhat inartful at AOB 6 in not
pointing out that the fact would come out in discovery and addressing that in the
argument section instead. It is far from the nefarious plot to mislead the Court
implied in the Metro Defendants’ unwarranted accusation. See MD Br. 7 n.3.
1

Metro Defendants, in their recitation of the instances in which this fact was
raised, MD Br. 3, fail to include the italicized language.
-5-
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Having all potential facts—including those which Ortega intends to actually prove
at trial—is valuable and proper for this Court to sufficiently satisfy the scope of its
review of the district court’s order.
Moreover, as will be demonstrated below, the central issue here is whether
Ortega had clearly established Fourth, Fifth, and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights
against being taken from home incarceration and placed in jail without probable
cause to believe a crime had been committed, and without due process of law.
Such a right was clearly established. And given the fact that it is undisputed that
Ortega was taken to jail against his will, reversal is appropriate here. The Metro
Defendants’ complaints about Ortega providing a more complete picture of the
circumstances, when the facts are taken in the light most favorable to the nonmovant based on what will be proven at trial, should not obscure the issues here.
II.

ORTEGA’S CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FIFTH AMENDMENT AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT LIBERTY INTEREST WAS
VIOLATED WHEN ORTEGA WAS REMOVED FROM HIS HOME
WITHOUT ANY PROCESS.
Qualified immunity is unavailable if “a constitutional right has been

violated,” and that the right was “clearly established.” Heyne, 655 F.3d at 562
(recognizing this test in a § 1983 context); see also AirTrans, Inc., 389 F.3d at 598
(recognizing this test in a Bivens context). And a motion to dismiss should be
granted only when immunity is “established on the face of the complaint,” Hafley
v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996).
-6-
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The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect against government actors
from depriving citizens “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. This due process protection
implicates a two-step analysis. First, a liberty interest must exist. Second, a
constitutionally-sufficient process must be provided in association with the
deprivation of such a liberty interest. Ky. Dep’t. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490
U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment analysis). There is
no dispute that there was no process provided to Ortega, so the only question here
is whether there was a clearly established liberty interest.
The Fourteenth Amendment itself, “by reason of guarantees implicit in the
word ‘liberty,’” can create a constitutionally-protected liberty interest. Wilkinson
v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Also, state law can create a constitutionallyprotected liberty interests. See Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 381
(1987). In this case, Richard Ortega pled guilty to criminal charges and was
sentenced to fourteen days of confinement. Commitment Order, 39-1R246. But
Ortega was not to be subjected to traditional jailhouse or prison confinement.
Instead, the Kentucky sentencing court ordered Ortega’s sentence to be completed
at home through Kentucky’s Home Incarceration Program, a creation of Kentucky
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law. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.200; 532.210; Home Incarceration Order, 431R295-96.2 This fact makes all the difference in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest analysis. The opening brief raised cases from five
circuits directly and clearly establishing a right against being taken to jail after
being provided custodial confinement outside the prison system. AOB 15-17. It
then addressed cases from this Court, the Supreme Court, and statements of
Kentucky law indirectly and clearly establishing the right. AOB 18-19.
Yet neither Cloyd nor the Metro Defendants squarely confront the practical
reality of Ortega’s participation in the Home Incarceration Program: that, being
permitted to remain in an alternative custodial confinement outside the walls of a
jailhouse or prison incarceration, Ortega was afforded a constitutionally-protected
liberty interest. Indeed, neither Cloyd nor the Metro Defendants analyze—or even
cite—the cases raised by Ortega as clearly establishing this right. Cloyd argues
that Ortega could not retain his constitutionally-protected liberty interest until after
Ortega completed his term of sentence. Cloyd Br. at 9. This argument ignores the
facts here. Determining whether a liberty interest exists in obtaining home
2

Metro Defendants’ citation to the Commitment Order’s section on “Releasing
Misdemeanants From Jail,” with “[illegible] FOR HIP” stamped over it, is
irrelevant. See Commitment Order, 39-1R246; Metro Defendants Appellees’ Brief
at 9-10 & n.4. The sentencing court was not releasing Ortega as a misdemeanant
from jail under KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 439.179 et seq., but was ordering an
alternative custodial release—home confinement—under KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 532.200 et seq. Metro Defendants fail to explain the relation between these two
statutes, and do not cite authority for such a relation.
-8-
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confinement as a sentence traditionally involves considering the mandatory nature
of that sentence. See, e.g., Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 379-81 (holding
that parole mandated by statute, if certain prerequisite factors exist, creates a
liberty interest); Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 402-04 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding
that parole, mandated by broad and non-particularized statutory guidance, only
creates a probability of parole and not an entitlement). That analysis—implicated
by Cloyd’s argument—is completely irrelevant here because it has no bearing on
whether a liberty interest in home confinement exists after a sentence of home
confinement has already been given. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (distinguishing parole release and
parole revocation on the basis that an individual already on parole, subject to
revocation, actively retains a liberty interest).
Ortega was already participating in home confinement as part of his
sentence. See Commitment Order, 39-1R246. Thus, Cloyd’s citation to Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), is inapposite. Meachum pertained to prisoners being
transferred from one prison to another. See id. at 216-22. The principle of
Meachum holds no weight in Ortega’s situation because the factual distinction
between an outside-the-walls confinement and traditional prison incarceration is
substantial. See also MD Br. 11-12 (making similar argument that there was no

-9-
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change in conditions of confinement). The liberty interests inherent to that home
confinement were therefore afforded to Ortega once he enrolled in the Home
Incarceration Program. See Paige, 341 F.3d at 643-44.
The Supreme Court, this Court, and other circuits have recognized that
maintaining an outside-the-walls status in lieu of traditional jailhouse or prison
confinement, like Ortega’s home confinement, is a constitutionally-protected
liberty interest. AOB 15-19. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this liberty
interest in the context of probation and parole. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 782 (1973) (probation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)
(parole). In turn, this Court has acknowledged such a liberty interest. See, e.g.,
Sneed v. Donahue, 993 F.2d 1239, 1241 (6th Cir. 1993) (recognizing a parolee’s
liberty-interest). Further, at least five other circuits have recognized that
alternative custodial confinement beyond the walls of a jail or prison—similar to
Kentucky’s Home Incarceration Program—implicate a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest. Thus, because Supreme Court authority, this Court’s authority, and
other circuit’s authority all establish a liberty interest in maintaining a status
outside the walls of a jail or prison, that liberty interest is clearly established. See
Myers v. Potter, 422 F.3d 347, 356 (6th Cir. 2005) (outlining which sources
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determine whether a right is clearly established); see also Moldowan v. City of
Warren, 478 F.3d 351, 382 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining when multiple other circuits
clearly established a right).
For their part, Metro Defendants assert that Ortega was not permitted to
actually leave his home under the conditions of his home incarceration. MD Br. at
10-11. This misses the point entirely. Even if Ortega was simply confined to his
home, home confinement, in and of itself, creates a liberty interest because of its
“numerous and obvious . . . qualitative differences” with traditional institutional
confinement. Pennsylvania v. Kriston, 588 A.2d 898, 899 (Pa. 1991). As the
Tenth Circuit explained: “The passage outside the walls of a prison does not
simply alter the degree of confinement; rather, it works a fundamental change in
the kind of confinement, a transformation that signals the existence of an inherent
liberty interest.” Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 566 (10th Cir. 1995). Moreover,
if provided the opportunity for discovery and trial, Ortega will prove that he wore
an ankle monitor and was permitted to go to work during his participation in home
confinement. Ortega therefore enjoyed a liberty interest in maintaining his home
confinement absent a violation of the terms of his Home Incarceration Program

- 11 -
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Order. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.220; Home Incarceration Order, 43-1R29596 (listing the terms of Ortega’s home confinement).3
Thus, regardless of whether Ortega’s “participation on HIP was revoked,”
MD Br. 12, Ortega’s liberty was revoked. And a core principle of due process is
the requirement that deprivation of a liberty interest mandates constitutionally
sufficient process. See Ky. Dep’t. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989). It is clearly established that revocation of a liberty interest requires some
form of hearing absent specified exceptions not at issue here. See, e.g., Bd. of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 & n.7 (1972).
Despite the existence and revocation of Ortega’s liberty interest, Ortega was
deprived of his constitutionally-mandated due process protections. Such
protections were violated when Ortega was not provided with any process. No
hearing ever occurred to determine whether Ortega should be removed from home
incarceration because of his alleged, and wholly incorrect, illegal alien status.
Second Amended Complaint, 38R235. Metro Defendants failed to look at

3

Metro Defendants incorrectly describe this position as declaring Ortega “could
not be moved from his residence while on HIP for any reason without a due
process hearing.” MD Br. at 11. That is flat untrue. AOB 19 (“Ortega was
entitled to continue to serve his sentence as agreed through the Home Incarceration
Program absent breaching the conditions of home incarceration” (emphasis
added)). Ortega only claims his clearly established right not to have his liberty
interest in home incarceration taken without due process. That liberty interest is
limited by the terms of his home incarceration agreement and any other factors
recognized by this Court or the Supreme Court.
- 12 -
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Ortega’s readily-available documentation to prove that he was a United States
citizen. Second Amended Complaint, 38R235. No defendant-appellee contests
that Ortega was not provided with any constitutionally-required hearing or any
other procedural protection.
Metro Defendants suggest that, assuming Ortega retained a constitutionallyprotected liberty interest, no hearing was required before that liberty interest was
deprived. See MD Br. at 12-13. The basis of Metro Defendants’ argument is that
an ICE-issued detainer created an urgency in light of illegal aliens presenting a
flight risk. See id. at 12.
Notably, Metro Defendants fail to explain how such an urgency was actually
present when they took Ortega out of home confinement and put him in jail.
Ortega was confined to his home on a predetermined schedule. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.220(3); Home Incarceration Order, 43-1R295-96. Ortega’s location
was being electronically monitored with an ankle bracelet and confirmed by
frequent phone calls. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.220(6); Home Incarceration
Order, 43-1R295-96. And Ortega was additionally pressured to abide by the terms
of his home incarceration because violating those terms could be prosecuted as
escape. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.220(2). The actual circumstances of Ortega’s
home incarceration nullified any legitimate urgency that might otherwise exist with
respect to illegal aliens. In sum, Metro Defendants failed to provide a valid
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government interest implicated by the facts here that justified delaying a hearing
until after Ortega’s removal from his home. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7.
Metro Defendants’ final argument attempts to excuse their actions by
characterizing the ICE detainer as having mandated that they “maintain custody”
of Ortega. See MD Br. at 15-16. Though unclear, Metro Defendants appear to
argue that the mandatory nature of the ICE detainer absolves them of liability. See
id. at 16-17. This Court need not address whether ICE-issued detainers mandate
state and local law enforcement action. Even assuming an ICE detainer required
Metro Defendants to maintain custody of Ortega and that such a mandate would be
constitutionally permissible, Metro Defendants already retained custody of Ortega
through home confinement. See Stroud v. Kentucky, 922 S.W.2d 382, 384-85 (Ky.
1996). For Metro Defendants to “maintain custody” over Ortega, nothing more
than leaving Ortega in his home confinement was required. See Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss, 40-1R257 (“Plaintiff was in the custody of Metro
Corrections to serve a sentence.”). To the extent the ICE detainer required any
action from Metro Corrections, that mandate did not extend to the unconstitutional
deprivation of Ortega’s liberty.
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ORTEGA’S CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEIZURES WAS VIOLATED
WHEN HE WAS REMOVED FROM HIS HOME WITHOUT A
WARRANT OR WITH ANY DEGREE OF REASONABLE
SUSPICION.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures. U.S. Const.

amend. IV; Brooks v. Rothe, 477 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2009). A seizure is the
“intentional interference with a person’s liberty by physical force or show of
authority that would cause a reasonable person consciously to submit.” Floyd v.
City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2008). As detailed above, Ortega had a
liberty interest, the scope of which was defined by his ability to live at home and
go to work. While Ortega exercised these liberties, Officers Eppler and Skaggs
removed Ortega from his home and transported Ortega to Metro Corrections’
holding facilities. Opinion and Order, 48R337. To accomplish this, Officers
Eppler and Skaggs necessarily detained Ortega by using their authority as
Corrections Officers to force Ortega to leave his home in their custody. Second
Amended Complaint, 38R234-35. Any reasonable person would have believed
himself unable to ignore Officers Eppler’s and Skaggs’s authority. Thus, under
clearly established law, Ortega was seized. See Floyd, 518 F.3d at 406.
Cloyd does not provide any argument against Ortega’s Fourth Amendment
claim. For their part, Metro Defendants contend that merely being detained does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment because Ortega was not seized. MD Br. at
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17-18. This argument ignores this Court’s clearly established Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and the alleged facts of this case. The only “permissible encounter[]
between police and citizens” that is not a seizure is a “consensual encounter[] in
which contact is initiated by a police officer without any articulable reason
whatsoever and the citizen is briefly asked some questions.” United States v.
Alston, 375 F.3d 408, 411 (6th Cir. 2004). The encounter between Officers Eppler
and Skaggs and Ortega has been pled as lengthy and nonconsensual. Second
Amended Complaint, 38R234-35.
Seizing an individual from his home traditionally requires a warrant. Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Metro Defendants do not contest that no
warrant was issued here. In any event, a seizure must ultimately be reasonable to
be constitutionally permissible. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
And reasonableness is determined by balancing the magnitude of the seizure
against the government’s need to seize. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8
(1985); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 740 (6th Cir. 2006). As
previously discussed, Metro Defendants had no need to seize Ortega because he
already was under home confinement. Indeed, it was a waste of resources to send
someone out to get him, take him to jail, and confine him there for four days. And,
of course, any seizure’s magnitude outweighs nothing.
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Metro Defendants assert that their ignorance of the ICE detainer’s faulty
basis for being issued absolved Officers Eppler’s and Skaggs’s seizure from being
unreasonable. MD Br. at 19-20. This misunderstands why Officers Eppler’s and
Skaggs’ seizure was unreasonable. As Cloyd relies upon in his brief, a ICE
detainer does not embody any particular degree of suspicion as to the detainer
target’s status. Instead, an ICE detainer occurs before any investigation has
occurred. Cloyd Br. at 11.
Claiming the opposite, Metro Defendants repeatedly assert on appeal that the
ICE detainer identified Ortega as an illegal alien. See, e.g., MD Br. at 6-7, 17-18.
That does not appear to be true. The Form I-247 Ortega believes to have been in
use at the time does not inherently identify the subject as an illegal alien.4 And the
actual detainer issued is not part of the record. Through discovery, Ortega will
have an opportunity to review the detainer issued against him, but he has not had
an opportunity to do so to this point.5

4

Multiple versions of Form I-247 exist. Prior to Ortega’s March 2011 seizure, at
least April 1997 and August 2010 versions existed. Both the August 2010 and
April 1997 versions of ICE Form I-247 can be found at:
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/immigration/detainers_issue_brief.pdf (Appendix D
contains the August 2010 version, and Appendix B contains April 1997 version).
5
As a common professional courtesy, counsel for Ortega sent a letter to counsel
for the Metro Defendants identifying this potential error and offering Metro
Defendants the opportunity to withdraw and re-file their brief without the factual
errors or provide a copy of the detainer proving that it did, in fact, identify Ortega
as an illegal alien. Counsel for Metro Defendants declined the offer, and instead
claimed that Ortega pleaded that the detainer identified him as an illegal alien.
- 17 -
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Assuming the ICE detainer issued here was like any other issued at the time,
as the Court must at the motion to dismiss stage, it did not provide Metro
Defendants with probable cause to arrest Ortega and take him to jail. Indeed, that
is not even the intent of a detainer. Detainers are issued to request that state
agencies continue detention as it already exists for up to 48 hours. ICE Form I-247
(requesting that the local law enforcement “maintain custody” of the individual);
Cloyd Br. at 11 (“[T]he purpose of issuing the detainer was to allow time to
conduct an investigation.”). In light of the nature of an ICE detainer as a document
that does not even necessarily claim that someone is an illegal alien, it is false that,
as set forth in their brief, Metro Defendants do not have a “duty” to independently
verify the basis for an ICE detainer before seizing someone rather than simply
continuing existing conditions of confinement. See MD Br. at 20.
Law enforcement agencies cannot absolve themselves of violations of
constitutional rights simply by dividing the different steps of the violation among
different agencies. It is indisputable that Metro Defendants, as state actors, do
Ortega states in his complaint that he was detained “based on an ICE detainer for
being an illegal alien,” meaning that the detainer is a document that is traditionally
issued with respect to illegal aliens, not that it identified Ortega as an illegal alien.
Second Amended Complaint, 38R234-35. But even if the complaint had expressly
stated the detainer identified Ortega as an illegal alien, given Metro Defendants’
access to the actual detainer, one would expect the duty of candor to the tribunal to
trigger a duty not to rely on a factual allegation if counsel knows or should know it
to be untrue. See Ky. Rules of Professional Conduct R. 3.130(3.3)(a) (candor
toward the tribunal). Counsel for Ortega responded with a letter noting this likely
duty, but at the time this brief was filed, no response had been received.
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have a duty to abide by the bounds of the Fourth Amendment. See Bills v.
Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that only state actors can
violate the Fourth Amendment). Thus, they cannot affect a seizure without
probable cause to do so. See Alston, 375 F.3d at 411. Acting solely upon an ICE
detainer, without any additional information or situational context providing other
indicia of suspicion, Metro Defendants seized Ortega without probable cause.
Metro Defendants therefore violated their duty to not infringe upon Ortega’s
Fourth Amendment rights.
IV.

CLOYD IS LIABLE FOR METRO DEFENDANTS’ DEPRIVATION
OF ORTEGA’S CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RIGHTS.
Cloyd does not challenge on appeal the district court’s determination that his

issuance of the ICE detainer was the but-for and proximate cause of Metro
Defendants removing Ortega from his home confinement and placing him in jail.
Opinion and Order, 29R183-85. Nor does he directly address Ortega’s statement
that being the but-for and proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation is all
that is required for liability. AOB 28, citing Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Public
Defender Com’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that individuals
who are “the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation of [a plaintiff’s]
federal rights” are responsible for those deprivations). Thus, by causing Ortega’s
unconstitutional seizure and detention without due process, Cloyd did violate
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Ortega’s constitutional rights—contrary to Cloyd’s conclusory statement
otherwise, Cloyd Br. 10.
Because of this deprivation, Cloyd is liable. In his defense, Cloyd focuses
on the claim that he made an objectively reasonable mistake within the scope his
employment. Cloyd Br. at 9-10. While qualified immunity may “include[]an
‘accommodation for reasonable error,’” Cloyd Br. 10 (citation omitted), Ortega did
not plead that Cloyd made a reasonable error. As Cloyd himself recognizes,
Ortega “asserts that ICE Agent Cloyd knew that the names and dates of birth did
not match at the time, but issued the detainer regardless.” Cloyd Br. 10. These
allegations are sufficient to satisfy this Court’s mental culpability standard for
liability, which requires more than a negligent mistake. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of
Memphis, 234 F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2000); Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343,
1351 (6th Cir. 1996). Cloyd’s acts do not amount to a mistake at all. It would be a
mistake—though perhaps an unreasonable one—if Cloyd thought the names and
birthdates matched. Ortega pled intentional conduct in which Cloyd knew exactly
what he was doing. And given the fact that the district court found—and Cloyd
does not refute—that it was foreseeable that the detainer would result in a seizure,
it is a violation of Ortega’s clearly established rights for ICE to cause that seizure
just based on having a name and birthdate that resemble the name and birthdate of
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someone already deported years ago. With that standard, ICE can simply detain
just about anyone with a common name of Latin origin.
V.

ORTEGA HAS NOT WAIVED ANY CLAIMS AGAINST ANY
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Ortega filed a Second Amended Complaint that included allegations against

Cloyd, Metro Corrections Officers Eppler and Skaggs, Louisville/Jefferson
Country Metro Government, and Mark Bolton. Second Amended Complaint,
38R235-40. As against Metro Government and Mark Bolton, Ortega alleged
specific claims of constitutional violations. See id., 38R238-39 (paragraphs 2630). Ortega has not waived any of these claims on appeal. Ortega clearly raised
Metro Government and Mark Bolton as parties responsible for Ortega’s
unconstitutional loss of liberty in his brief. See AOB 2 (defining “Metro
Defendants” as including Metro Government and Bolton). On remand, and after
discovery, the full extent of Bolton and Metro Government’s roles in directing
Officers Eppler and Skaggs to seize Ortega can be explored. But at this stage, it is
sufficient that the allegations were made in the complaint, and the brief on appeal
included them among the parties responsible for Ortega’s unreasonable seizure and
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Metro Defendants’ waiver claim
lacks any basis in fact or law.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order dismissing this case should be reversed,
and the case should be remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Tillman J. Breckenridge
Tillman J. Breckenridge
Alison R.W. Toepp
REED SMITH LLP
1301 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-414-9200
tbreckenridge@reedsmith.com
Patricia E. Roberts
WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL
P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23187
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perobe@wm.edu
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